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Why Should Competition Lawyers Care about the
Formal Rule of Law?
Ryan Stones∗
Bruce Wardhaugh, Competition, Effects and Predictability: Rule of Law
and the Economic Approach to Competition, Oxford: Hart, 2020, 272
pp, hb £70.00
Competition law scholarship tends to be preoccupied with questions of sub-
stance. ‘More’ or ‘less’ intervention? Contentment or concern with concen-
trated markets? Which business practices should be prohibited? These are key
issues with significant consequences for enforcement.But the substantive reach
of competition law – the ‘what’ we prohibit – cannot be divorced from ques-
tions of the legal form of market intervention – ‘how’we determine legality. At
what likelihood of harm do we adopt a presumption of illegality for a prac-
tice? When an anticompetitive impact is more likely than not? Solely when
convinced that it is harmful in every circumstance, for fear of condemning
efficient conduct? Alternatively, if we can only be sure that a practice is anti-
competitive following individualised, context-specific analysis of its economic
consequences, should commercial uncertainty, the risk of errors, and scarce re-
sources suggest that it isn’t worth the hassle?
Competition, Effects and Predictability by Bruce Wardhaugh is notable for di-
rectly addressing questions of legal form in competition enforcement.Its novelty
derives from a strong emphasis upon the formal rule of law.To those unfamiliar
with European competition scholarship, such ‘novelty’ – and indeed responses
to the title of this article – may seem banal. But that really isn’t the case.
Scholarly appreciation for realising the formal rule of law in EU competition
enforcement has been marginal since the 1960s, owing to a near consensus that
effects-based, ad hoc determinations of legality constitute the economically op-
timal form of market intervention. In 1967 René Joliet criticised the fledging
European regime for adopting generalised presumptions,bluntly delineating the
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boundary between legality and illegality.1 Sophisticated enforcement required ‘a
thorough factual analysis,on a case-by-case basis, in the light of economic inves-
tigation’, thereby accurately prohibiting the ‘bad’ and permitting the ‘good’.2
This set the tone for decades. Some question the need for competition law
to be predictable.3 Others have advocated determining the legality of business
conduct through context-specific economic analysis of its competitive effect,4
thereby undermining aspirations towards a system of clear and generalised obli-
gations.5 This has been especially pronounced in scholarship critical of EU law
on abuses of market dominance.6 Other imperfect generalisations intended to
foster legal certainty – block exemption regulations,7 indicative enforcement
guidelines8 –have also been dismissed as formalistic ‘pigeon-holing’,9 ignoring
the actual economic consequences of the conduct in question.
Resistance to this consensus on the appropriate form of competition law is
difficult to pinpoint in European scholarship before the mid-2000s.10 But in
the last 15 years this has started to change. Several scholars have challenged the
notion that realising generalised, predictable norms, and economically sophisti-
cated enforcement are mutually exclusive. Sometimes labelled a ‘Neo’-Chicago
approach, they advocate the incorporation of economic learning into the de-
sign of presumptions and structured tests, thereby aiming to reconcile accurate
economic outcomes with approximating the formal rule of law.11
Competition, Effects and Predictability contributes to this debate. Wardhaugh’s
overall argument is that an ‘effects-based approach’ to determining legality ‘is
a threat to the rule of law’ (2). Following an account of how both competition
law in the US (Chapter 2) and EU (Chapter 3) have increasingly favoured this
means for determining legality, Wardhaugh ultimately adopts a solution akin
to the ‘Neo’-Chicagoans of incorporating economic learning into the ex ante
1 R. Joliet, The Rule of Reason in Antitrust Law: American, German and Common Market Laws in
Comparative Perspective (Liège: Faculté de Droit de l’Université de Liège, 1967) 117.
2 ibid, 190.
3 For example I. Forrester, ‘The Modernisation of EC Antitrust Policy: Compatibility, Efficiency,
Legal Security’ in C. Ehlermann and I. Atanasiu (eds), European Competition Law Annual 2000:
The Modernisation of EC Antitrust Policy (Oxford: Hart, 2001) 102-103.
4 For example V.Korah, ‘EEC Competition Policy – Legal Form or Economic Efficiency’ (1986)
39 CLP 85, 92-93.
5 The exception is the presumptive illegality of cartels.
6 For example Economic Advisory Group on Competition Policy, ‘An Economic Approach to
Article 82’ 2-6 at http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/competition/economist/eagcp_july_21_05.pdf (last
visited 3 December 2020).
7 For example S. Bishop, ‘Modernisation of the Rules Implementing Article 81 and 82’ in Ehler-
mann and Atanasiu, n 3 above, 56.
8 For example P. Akman, ‘‘Consumer Welfare’ and Article 82EC: Practice and Rhetoric’ (2009)
32World Competition 71, 78.
9 See D.Hay, ‘Pigeonholes in Antitrust’ (1984) 29 Antitrust Bulletin 133.
10 For example R.Whish and B. Sufrin, ‘Article 85 and the Rule of Reason’ (1987) 7 YEL 1, 37.
11 For example D. Evans and J. Padilla, ‘Designing Antitrust Rules for Assessing Unilateral Prac-
tices: A Neo-Chicago Approach’ (2005) 72 U Chicago LR 73; A. Christiansen and W. Kerber,
‘Competition Policy with Optimally Differentiated Rules Instead of “Per Se Rules Vs Rule
of Reason”’ (2006) 2 JCLE 215; Y. Katsoulacos and D. Ulph, ‘On Optimal Legal Standards for
Competition Policy: A General Welfare-Based Analysis’ (2009) 57 Journal of Industrial Economics
410.
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design of presumptions and structured tests (11-12, 211–212, 222).12 In this
way, competition enforcement can be economically informed and foster legal
certainty for businesses.
Competition,Effects and Predictability has much promise as the first monograph-
length analysis of the formal rule of law in competition law.The significance of
the ideal tends to be underdeveloped in this field, limiting its conceptual clout
in contemporary debates on the form of market intervention.Wardhaugh had
the opportunity to offer a clarion call for fellow advocates of the formal rule of
law in competition enforcement, providing a persuasive articulation of why it
matters, anchoring other scholarship critical of the formal consensus. It could
also have caused those advocating case-by-case, effects-based determinations of
legality to directly address the consequences of their preferred form of market
intervention.
Competition, Effects and Predictability fails to realise this potential. Unfortu-
nately, it does so in a way that is arguably more damaging for those of us who
sympathise with Wardhaugh’s aim of re-emphasising the rule of law in com-
petition circles. The problem is that the argument of the book falls at the first
hurdle:Competition, Effects and Predictability doesn’t offer a compelling account
of why any reader, ally or adversary, should care about the formal rule of law in
competition enforcement.Wardhaugh’s account of ‘The Rule of Law andWhy
it Matters’ (Chapter 1) is so underwhelming that it is incapable of sustaining
analysis of the ideal’s alleged demise for the rest of the book. After hinting that
the origins of the concept lie in attempts to constrain centralised power (16-17),
such justificatory beginnings are quickly abandoned as ‘not our task’ (17).Ward-
haugh is correct that ethereal jurisprudential discussions of the rule of law are
easily dismissed as a lawyerly fetish in a field animated by economic goals in real-
world markets (14). But that does not mean that one must choose political or
economic justifications for the formal rule of law in competition enforcement.
In any event, Wardhaugh advances neither for around 20 pages. The reader
is instead offered a basic account of the formal conceptualisation of the rule of
law through a listing of desiderata proposed by Lon Fuller and Joseph Raz (18-
19).Occasional references are made to predictability, guiding legal subjects, and
avoiding arbitrary decision-making (18-21), but no sustained attempt is made
to convince the reader of their importance. If anything,Wardhaugh’s lukewarm
allusions to any ‘pros’ makes his explicit consideration of the ‘cons’ hit even
harder: the ideal upon which he grounds Competition, Effects and Predictability
is compatible with ‘even the most abhorrent regimes’ (21) and coheres with
‘laws that are bad or wrong or even evil in content’ (22). Although Wardhaugh
ultimately accepts that substantive interpretations are too broad (24-27), the
damage to the formal account has already been done.
His next step is to demonstrate that the formal rule of law is valued by the
USA and EU legal orders, occasionally being mentioned in judicial decisions
(27-35).Again, a justification for why it should be considered important in com-
petition law is absent; this is unfortunate given reference to the is/ought fallacy
immediately beforehand (26).
12 However unlike ‘Neo’-Chicagoans,Wardhaugh advocates including non-economic goals when
designing legal tests (212).
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The final substantive section of the chapter is titled ‘Why the Rule of Law
Matters’. Although reiterating that convincing competition commentators will
require a robust economic justification, Wardhaugh instead offers a paragraph
on New Institutional Economics (36), recognition that ‘the rule of law’ is a
World Bank development indicator (37-38), acknowledgement that interna-
tional investment treaties attempt to stabilise the regulatory environment (38-
39), and brief reflections on uncertainty as a transaction cost (40).
Is that all there is? Is that what commentators in competition circles are de-
fending or disregarding? A concept of murky liberal origins, purely concerned
with legal certainty but without clear justification, compatible with evil but oc-
casionally mentioned by judges, and included within investment relations and
pseudo-scientific development indicators? No wonder concern for the formal
rule of law has been drowned out by a push towards effects-based analysis; even
those sympathetic to Wardhaugh’s argument will finish the chapter wondering
whether the formal rule of law ideal is worth fighting for in competition law.
The main purpose of this piece is to achieve what Wardhaugh does not: to
argue why competition lawyers should care about the formal rule of law. To
effectively scrutinise individualised, effects-based determinations of legality and
to advocate a more balanced reconciliation of accurate outcomes with realising
the formal rule of law, a compelling articulation of what is at stake is neces-
sary. In failing to explain its value within this specific context of economically
animated market interventions, concerns about the appropriate form of com-
petition law can easily be dismissed as stereotypical lawyerly qualms.This article
will articulate the political and economic significance of the formal rule of law
in competition policy.
This is not to say that with stronger foundations Competition, Effects and Pre-
dictability would be free from problems. Having built his theory around the
importance of legal certainty,Wardhaugh’s subsequent embrace of behavioural
economics may be difficult to reconcile with the assumption of rationality un-
derpinning the formal rule of law. Furthermore, the exclusive focus upon pre-
dictability is too narrow: the equal application of generalised laws is almost
entirely absent from consideration; and Wardhaugh’s criticism of courts misses
their importance for dynamically approximating the formal rule of law, thereby
making the ideal more achievable. For the formal rule of law to be taken se-
riously in competition scholarship, it is critical that such inconsistencies and
omissions are avoided.
DEFINING THE FORMAL RULE OF LAW
The rule of law is an aspirational ideal that goes beyond the mere requirement
of legal validity.For instance,a legitimately enacted lawmay create secret obliga-
tions or confer discretionary power for a decision-maker to act as they ‘see fit’.
While technically ‘legal’,many would argue that such situations are contrary to
the rule of law, which represents a valuable ‘extra’ beyond bare legality.
Difficulties arise when deciding what this ‘extra’ should entail. The rule of
law has maintained its position as a key idea of Western legal philosophy for
© 2021 The Authors.The Modern Law Review published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd on behalf of Modern Law Review Limited.
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centuries owing to its malleability.13 This necessitates precision as to the con-
ceptualisation adopted from an extensive back catalogue.
Wardhaugh adopts a ‘formal’ understanding to critique US and EU compe-
tition enforcement (16-27).As the title of the book suggests, his principal focus
is the predictability of legal obligations for businesses. While a sound starting
point, normative certainty is not enough. First,Wardhaugh never grapples with
a common motif of the formal conceptualisations upon which he draws: the
generality of laws. Second, although Wardhaugh inconclusively flirts with the
suggestion (22-24), legal certainty is an unrealistic and static ideal without an
institutional mechanism for reviewing decision-making, resolving disputes, and
dynamically readjusting the law in response to change.
The conceptualisation of the formal rule of law argued here to be important
for competition enforcement comprises three principles:
(1) Comprehensible laws, capable of internalisation by subjects.
(2) Generalised laws of equal application.
(3) Judicial review and adjudication.
At the outset, it is important to stress the aspirational nature of the first two
principles. To realise the formal rule of law ideal is to progress along a sliding
scale of legal forms, from ‘less’ to ‘more’ comprehensible and generalised. It is
their impossibility that highlights the instrumental importance of the third as a
mechanism for gradually refining the legal order towards the ideal.
Like Wardhaugh, the following account of the rule of law derives from the
similar conceptualisations offered by Fuller14 and Raz,15 as well as critics.16
It also draws from Hayek’s writing.17 Wardhaugh’s reluctance to engage with
Hayek is a mistake.18 Hayek interacted and affiliated with the Ordoliberals and
the Chicago School of antitrust, both of whom occupy prominent positions
within the intellectual history of the field. Furthermore, Hayek synthesised
theorising on the rule of law with considerations of economic order. These
aspects make his writing especially relevant when evaluating the desirable form
for market interventions in pursuit of the economic goals of competition policy.
LikeWardhaugh’s (initial) approach (24-27),this conceptualisation of the rule
of law is not substantive.19 It casts no judgement on the content of law and the
ends pursued; it could be ‘good’ or ‘bad’, economically informed or illiterate.
13 For an overview: B. Tamanaha, On the Rule of Law: History, Politics, Theory (Cambridge: CUP,
2004).
14 L. Fuller,The Morality of Law (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, rev ed, 1969) 33-39.
15 J. Raz, ‘The Rule of Law and its Virtue’ in The Authority of Law: Essays on Law and Morality
(1979,Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2011) 214-218.
16 R. Unger, Law in Modern Society: Toward a Criticism of Social Theory (New York, NY: Free Press,
1977) 52-54, 176-177; P. Nonet and P. Selznick, Law & Society in Transition: Toward Responsive
Law (1978, New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers, 2001) 53-54.
17 F.Hayek,The Road to Serfdom (1944, London:Routledge, 2001) (Serfdom) 75-76;Law, Legislation
and Liberty (1973/1976/1979, London: Routledge, 2013) (LLL) 116.
18 Save for a reference to Hayek and Raz advancing similar accounts (18).
19 R. Summers, ‘A Formal Theory of the Rule of Law’ (1993) 6 Ratio Juris 127, 135-138; P.Craig,
‘Formal and Substantive Conceptions of the Rule of Law:An Analytical Framework’ [1997] PL
467, 477-487.
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It is also silent on the democratic credentials of laws.20 But these limitations are
not fatal. The pragmatic defence of a thin conceptualisation is that advocates
of wider definitions of the rule of law commonly accept the desirability of
these formal characteristics anyway.21 The defence from principle is that rather
than a failing, deliberate minimalism isolates the desirable consequences of the
purely formal and institutional desiderata, without their being lost in broader
visions of political theory and constitutional design.22 While acknowledging
the substantive critique (21-22, 24–25), Wardhaugh ultimately accepts these
counterclaims to justify focusing upon the formal rule of law (26-27), albeit
inconsistently.23
The significance of each element of the formal rule of law ideal will be
advanced in turn.
COMPREHENSIBLE LAWS
Principle 1 – Comprehensible laws, capable of internalisation by subjects: the ability
to comprehend legal obligations and determine actions in response. This capac-
ity for ‘internalisation’ or’comprehensibility’ is a catch-all for the variety of formal
characteristics frequently posited: clarity, publicity, prospectivity, consistency, possi-
bility, etc. Its antithesis is the promulgation of incomprehensible laws that cannot
be internalised by subjects resulting from, for example, their secrecy, ambiguity, in-
consistency, or requiring the impossible.
Wardhaugh’s (initial) vision of the formal rule of law is essentially that compe-
tition law ought to be clear to legal subjects (18-19), recounting Fuller’s famous
principles (publicity, prospectivity, clarity, etc).24 But why should competition
lawyers care? It will be argued that throughout centuries of liberal political
theory, approximating this ideal respects the rationality of legal subjects.Clearly
delineating rights and obligations amplifies the meaningful exercise of indi-
vidual freedom. In reflecting this rationality, it also facilitates the attribution of
responsibility for illegality.New Institutional Economics similarly illustrates that
market actors rely upon informational cues provided by institutions, including
laws. Comprehensible norms are institutions that economic operators can rely
upon to undertake efficient market decisions.
Political significance
Wardhaugh offers two paragraphs situating the rule of law within liberal efforts
to control state power, decides there is no need to consider this further, and
continues with oblique allusions to liberty, rationality, and avoiding arbitrariness
20 cf J.Habermas,Between Facts and Norms (Cambridge:Polity Press,W.Rehg trans, 1996) 102-103.
21 For example R. Dworkin,A Matter of Principle (Oxford: OUP, 1985) 13; Habermas, ibid, 82-83,
143-144, 153-154.
22 Raz, n 15 above, 211.
23 Chapter 5 argues that judicial changes to law are antidemocratic, ‘which has significant impli-
cations for the rule of law’ (153, 161-164, 171-172, 220).
24 Fuller, n 14 above, 33-39.
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(16-18).But to persuasively convey the political significance of comprehensible
laws in competition enforcement, it really is necessary to dive into political
liberalism. Without such anchoring, references to certainty seem trite and are
vulnerable to marginalisation.
Understanding the political significance of the formal rule of law requires
recognition of the inescapable tension between two foundational principles of
political liberalism, which is responsible for its manifold interpretations. The
first is the importance of individual liberty (freedom, autonomy), the ability to
pursue one’s wishes without impediment.25 The second is the requirement for
centralised coercion,which derives its importance from the first: as everybody’s
liberty represents a threat to the freedom of others, the state must guarantee
zones of mutual autonomy and resolve disagreements. This is freedom through
law: the creation of rights and obligations that act as boundaries between in-
dividuals, as well as mechanisms for adjudication and enforcement.26 Friction
comes from recognition that centralised power is both a guarantor of and threat
to liberty.27 Acceptance of coercion to ensure mutual freedom therefore can-
not be carte blanche for absolute authority. For centuries, liberals have offered
alternative reconciliations between individual freedom and restrained gover-
nance. A recurrent solution is a constitution that substantively delineates the
powers conferred centrally and individual rights,28 often accompanied by the
institutional separation of legislative, executive, and judicial functions to dilute
power.29 Without competence conferral and protected rights, freedom is en-
joyed only so long as the state and/or the majority wills it.30
The formal rule of law offers additional tools for addressing the tension be-
tween liberty and centralised power at the heart of liberalism. It is not just the
mere presence of ‘Guards and fences’vis-à-vis other citizens and government that
facilitates freedom to pursue one’s ends,31 but the formal comprehensibility of such
boundaries. This connection between legal certainty and freedom was present
at the birth of political liberalism. John Locke idealised the laws apportioning
spheres of autonomy as offering a ‘standing Rule to live by’ rather than ‘in-
constant, uncertain, unknown’ acts.32 He went so far as to argue that the legal
25 For example I. Kant, ‘The Metaphysics of Morals’ in M. Gregor (ed), Immanuel Kant: Practical
Philosophy (1797, Cambridge: CUP, 1996) 220; Hayek, LLL n 17 above, 55.
26 For example J.Locke,Second Treatise of Government and a Letter Concerning Toleration (1690,Oxford:
OUP, 2016) [S7], [S57], [S87]-[S88], [S124]-[S126], [S136], [S222]; Kant, ibid, 450-460; Hayek,
Serfdom n 17 above, 60-62, 86; F. Hayek, The Constitution of Liberty (1960, London: Routledge,
2006) (Constitution) 13, 19-20, 122-123; Hayek, LLL n 17 above, 102, 201-204, 496; B. Leoni,
Freedom and the Law (Princeton, NJ: Van Nostrand, 1961) 2-3.
27 For example Locke, ibid, [S93], [S137]; Hayek, LLL ibid, 462; R. Epstein, Skepticism and Freedom:
A Modern Case for Classical Liberalism (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 2003) 57.
28 For example Hayek,Constitution n 26 above, 92;Hayek,LLL ibid, 2;R.Epstein,Design for Liberty:
Private Property, Public Administration, and the Rule of Law (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University
Press, 2011) 64.
29 Montesquieu, ‘The Spirit of the Laws’ in The Complete Works of M de Montesquieu Volume I (1748,
London: T Evans, 1777) 198-199. Similarly: Locke, n 26 above, [S124]-[S126]; Hayek,LLL ibid,
2; Epstein, ibid, 27.
30 Hayek,Serfdom n 17 above,74;Hayek,Constitution n 26 above,90-93;Hayek,LLL ibid,1,346-347;
Leoni, n 26 above, 7.
31 Locke, n 26 above, [S222].
32 ibid, [S22].
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sovereign ought to be bound to act through the form of ‘establish’d, standing
Laws, promulgated and known to the People’.33 Legal certainty facilitated the
meaningful exercise of liberty as actions could be guided by known obligations,
‘safe and secure within the limits of the Law’.34
The link between legal comprehensibility and liberty is central to two promi-
nent twentieth-century accounts of the formal rule of law.Repackaged as hon-
ouring rational autonomy to plan one’s affairs, both Raz and Hayek situate the
ability to internalise rights and obligations at the core of their definitions of the
rule of law.35 To construct paths for action in pursuit of their ends, citizens have
to be able ‘to foresee some of the conditions of [their] environments’.36 Realis-
ing the ideal of comprehensible laws aims to provide the clearest articulation of
rights and obligations for ‘maximal certainty of expectations’.37 This is not just
important for interactions between private actors,38 where ‘good fences make
good neighbours’, but also vertical relations with centralised authority. By for-
mally avoiding retroactive or vague laws, unforeseeable exercises of power are
minimised.39 Prospectively delineating the boundary between legal and illegal
permits rational subjects to avoid transgressions and know that their plans won’t
be unexpectedly thwarted.40 Clear laws foster expectations that can be relied
upon.41 In contrast, incomprehensible laws and unforeseeable coercion render
freedom indeterminate, chilling decision-making through fear of unknowing
illegality.42 This is why liberals sometimes prefer a predictably ‘bad’ norm to no
indication of rights and obligations at all.43
Respect for rationality through aspiring towards legal certainty also relates
to the relationship between free choices and the attribution of responsibility.
Acknowledging rationality makes it possible to ‘assign both credit and blame
to individuals for their own actions.’44 Individuals ought not to be penalised
for conduct that they could not foresee as prohibited and with which they
could not choose to comply.45 This raises difficulties for judicially formulated
laws which result from contestation as to the scope of illegality, for example ju-
risprudence on Articles 101 and 102 TFEU which constitutes the main source
of EU competition law. The same is true of administrative decision-making
which pushes the boundaries of pre-existing obligations. How is ex post deter-
mination of legality to be reconciled with absolution for unknowable violations
of the law? If the importance of normative comprehensibility is recognised and
33 ibid, [S131].
34 ibid, [S137].
35 Raz, n 15 above, 214; Hayek, Serfdom n 17 above, 75-76.
36 Hayek,Constitution n 26 above, 118. Similarly, Habermas, n 20 above, 143-144, 201.
37 Hayek, LLL n 17 above, 103.
38 ibid, 102.
39 Raz, n 15 above, 219, 224.
40 Hayek, Serfdom n 17 above, 76, 79; Hayek,Constitution n 26 above, 137.
41 Raz, n 15 above, 220-222; J. Waldron, ‘The Rule of Law in Contemporary Liberal Theory’
(1989) 2 Ratio Juris 79, 84, 88.
42 J. Rawls, A Theory of Justice: Revised Edition (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1999)
208, 210.
43 Tamanaha, n 13 above, 67.
44 Epstein, n 27 above, 140.
45 Hayek,Constitution n 26 above, 181; Rawls, n 42 above, 209, 212.
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the connection between rationality and responsibility acknowledged,previously
unforeseeable illegality ought to result in no punishment.46
To summarise, the political virtue of aspiring to laws that are comprehen-
sible to subjects is that it permits them to meaningfully exercise their rational
autonomy and freedom to plan their affairs. It also facilitates the attribution of
responsibility. One might respond that this is fine, but that we are concerned
with competition policy; market interventions in pursuit of economic goals. We can
however reach similar conclusions on the significance of legal certainty via eco-
nomic means.
Economic significance
Wardhaugh rightly notes that for the formal rule of law to be given appro-
priate attention in competition scholarship, its economic significance needs to
be emphasised (14). But highlighting international development indicators and
stabilisation clauses in investment treaties (37-39) is insufficient. Intuition in-
dicates that more stable environments facilitate market activity, but how can
we persuasively convey this to competition lawyers? As Competition, Effects and
Predictability succinctly suggests (36), one option is to turn to New Institutional
Economics (NIE).
Neo-classical microeconomic theory offers a toolbox for exploring the foun-
dational concepts underpinning competition enforcement. Its analytical value
derives from a methodology of deliberate abstraction and assumption, isolating a
few moving parts to understand how stylised markets may or may not produce
societally beneficial results. Without diminishing the value of this endeavour,
real-world markets operate within a framework of institutions – laws, customs,
money – that exogenously impact the working of the economic order.This was
not lost on CarlMenger,47 high priest of nineteenth-century neo-classicism,nor
Adam Smith, who suggested that differing economic performance may relate
to a country’s ‘laws and institutions’.48
How institutions affect markets is the focus of NIE. Although its geneal-
ogy involves multiple strands,49 two elements are of note. The first is Hayek’s
later writing on the free economic order, ‘catallaxy’,50 which operated sponta-
neously through a decentralised process of mutual adjustment by market actors
with little individual knowledge in response to price signals.51 Rather than an
equilibrium end-state with guaranteed benefits, Hayek’s epistemological dis-
taste for constructivist rationalism52 led him to conceptualise competition as
46 cf M. Eben, ‘Fining Google: A Missed Opportunity for Legal Certainty?’ (2018) 14 ECJ 129.
47 A. Schotter, The Economic Theory of Social Institutions (Cambridge: CUP, 1981) 3-5; V. Vanberg,
Rules and Choice in Economics (London:Routledge, 1994) 145.
48 A. Smith,The Wealth of Nations Books I-III (1776, London: Penguin, 1999) 197-198.
49 Other sub-disciplines include property rights economics,public choice theory,and constitutional
economics, the latter two of which are discussed later.
50 Hayek, LLL n 17 above, 269.
51 ibid, 14-15, 275-277.
52 ibid, 10-11, 28, 35-37.
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an experimental discovery procedure.53 Our ‘necessary and irremediable ig-
norance’54 was clearest in the economy,55 justifying faith in the decentralised
market order to coordinate disparate pieces of information.56 The laws sur-
rounding market transactions influenced such spontaneous ordering. As cura-
tors of the legal framework within which economic forces occur, the legislature
and courts ensured the automatic market mechanism ‘is kept in working or-
der’.57 The second formative impetus for NIE was transaction cost economics.58
Building on foundations laid by Ronald Coase,59 Oliver Williamson inves-
tigated how market concentration, opportunism, and uncertainty influenced
contractual governance mechanisms between businesses and whether to inter-
nalise processes.60 When the importance of transaction costs is emphasised, the
efficient operation of market forces becomes dependent upon the institutional
context within which economic activity occurs;61 it cannot be assumed that
law is a benefit rather than a cost in business decision-making.62
NIE can be reduced to several tenets on the relationship between markets
and law.63 The starting position is that neo-classical price theory abstracts away
from the impact of uncertainty on decision-making and how institutions arise
in response.64 The efficient operation of the price mechanism is hindered by a
lack of complete information on future conditions and the behaviour of oth-
ers.65 Institutions develop to provide predictable regularity;66 ‘rules of the game’
within which economic processes take place.67 Whether emerging organically
(for example conventions) or deliberately (for example legislation),68 they offer
stability by limiting the range of permissible options open to market actors –
prohibiting certain practices, delineating rights and obligations – which ren-
ders decision-making simpler and the conduct of others more foreseeable.69





57 ibid, 45-46. Similarly: 274;Hayek, Serfdom n 17 above, 37, 39-41;Hayek,Constitution n 26 above,
62.
58 Schotter, n 47 above, 147.
59 R. Coase, ‘The Nature of the Firm’ (1937) 4 Economica 386; R. Coase, ‘The Problem of Social
Cost’ (1960) 3 JLE 1.
60 O. Williamson, ‘The Economics of Antitrust: Transaction Cost Considerations’ (1974) 122
UPaLRev 1439, 1442-1447.
61 O.Williamson, ‘Markets and Hierarchies: Some Elementary Considerations’ (1973) 63 American
Economic Review 316.
62 O.Williamson, ‘Credible Commitments:Using Hostages to Support Exchange’ (1983) 73 Amer-
ican Economic Review 519, 520.
63 This account is based upon: Schotter, n 47 above;W.Kasper and M.Streit, Institutional Economics:
Social Order and Public Policy (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 1998); C. Mantzavinos, Individuals,
Institutions, and Markets (Cambridge: CUP, 2001).
64 Schotter, ibid, 149-150;Vanberg, n 47 above, 77;Kasper and Streit, ibid, 3;Mantzavinos, ibid, 166.
65 Kasper and Streit, ibid, 44-45;Mantzavinos, ibid, 86.
66 Schotter, n 47 above, 11; Kasper and Streit, ibid, 28.
67 Schotter, ibid, 6;Mantzavinos, n 63 above, 167-168.
68 Schotter, ibid, 28-29; Kasper and Streit, n 63 above, 100, 116-117.
69 Schotter, ibid, 109, 118; Kasper and Streit, ibid, 1-3, 95, 118;Mantzavinos, n 63 above, 89.
70 Schotter, ibid, 139; Vanberg, n 47 above, 18; Kasper and Streit, ibid, 95-96;Mantzavinos, ibid, 87.
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markets more efficient by systemically reducing uncertainty, so that actors can
more effectively respond to the price mechanism.71
The economic significance of legal certainty is as follows. Institutions are in-
formational cues upon which market actors rely to facilitate their spontaneous
ordering through the price mechanism, with the framework of legal norms
constituting one of the most important signals. But if particular laws are to
be effective institutions– economising on information, delineating rights and
obligations – for efficient decentralised coordination, they ought to be com-
prehensible to actors (clear, public, prospective, etc).72 NIE is premised upon
roadblocks to rational decision-making and investigates how institutions arise
to counteract uncertainty: this is not simply about having institutions which
shape economic behaviour, but of how their formal nature can amplify their
effectiveness.73 This is functionally equivalent to what Kasper and Streit call the
‘normative impact’ of institutions.74 Given that laws are informational signals
facilitating the efficient operation of a free market economy, they argue that
the formal rule of law is ‘essential to the proper functioning of the capitalist
system.’75
The suggestion that legal certainty stabilises expectations and facilitates the
optimal operation of economic forces has roots in the writing of noted Or-
doliberal Franz Böhm. According to Böhm, the optimal ‘functioning of the
free market system presupposes the existence of the private law society’,76 the
normative framework shaping all economic interactions.77 Ernst Mestmäcker,
his student and formative influence upon EU competition policy, has synthe-
sised Böhm’s theory and NIE to stress that comprehensible laws are amongst
the foundational institutions of market economies by providing ‘expectations
that people can rely on’.78 The same is deducible from Hayek’s reflections on
the state’s role in maintaining the framework within which markets operate.
Ideally they should reflect nomos,Hayek’s later articulation of the formal rule of
law, owing to its facilitation of legal certainty: mutual adjustment to the price
mechanism is more effective where ‘there is a known delimitation of the sphere
of control of each individual’.79 Essentially, if we want rational actors to pursue
their own ends for the benefit of all, they must reliably know the boundary
between legality and illegality.80
To summarise the justification from NIE for the economic significance
of comprehensibility, this formal ideal makes law an effective institution: a
regulatory framework more predictably and precisely communicating rights
71 Schotter, ibid, 109; D. Schmidtchen, ‘German “Ordnungspolitik” as Institutional Choice’ (1984)
140 Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics 54, 67;Mantzavinos, ibid, 214-215.
72 Kasper and Streit, n 63 above, 96, 122-123 127, 137, 165-168; Tamanaha, n 13 above, 119, 121.
73 Kasper and Streit, ibid, 96.
74 ibid, 122.
75 ibid, 168.
76 F. Böhm, ‘Rule of Law in a Market Economy’ in H.Willgerodt and A. Peacock (eds) Germany’s
Social Market Economy: Origins and Evolution (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 1989) 54.
77 ibid, 49-50.
78 E.Mestmäcker, ‘A Legal Theory without Law: Posner v. Hayek on Economic Analysis of Law’
(2008) 37-40 at https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1168422 (last visited 3 December 2020).
79 Hayek,Constitution n 26 above, 140.
80 ibid, 140-141.
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and obligations to economic actors, within which spontaneous market-based
ordering through the price mechanism can occur in confidence.
Behavioural economics: friend or foe of the formal rule of law?
Before continuing to articulate why other principles of the formal rule of law
are significant, it is necessary to address one part of Competition, Effects and Pre-
dictability which perhaps raises more questions than it answers for proponents
of realising the formal rule of law in competition enforcement.
In Chapter 4 Wardhaugh adopts the insights of behavioural economics
to argue that contemporary enforcement fails to deliver legal certainty. Fol-
lowing Stucke’s effort to translate the behavioural approach to law and eco-
nomics scholarship81 into antitrust,82 Wardhaugh offers a thorough account of
its main findings (127-139). Rather than the absolute rationality assumed by
neo-classical price theory,where individuals consistently choose the most ben-
eficial course of action available, empirical evidence indicates that rationality
is bounded. While this is comparable to New Institutional Economics,83 be-
havioural economics homes in upon the myriad biases and heuristics (rules of
thumb) that systematically distort individual judgement and decision-making,
producing outcomes that depart from rational utility maximisation. Examples
include inertia, perceptions of fairness, favouring smaller short-term gains over
greater long-term benefits, overestimating rare but vivid possibilities (for ex-
ample plane crashes), and being influenced by irrecoverable past costs.84 Ward-
haugh utilises these phenomena to critique economic approaches to tying,
predatory pricing, and market self-correction which all rely upon the ratio-
nality of consumers, businesses, and potential rivals respectively (139-149). He
concludes that the assumption of unbounded decision-making leads to errors of
underenforcement; a neo-classical / Chicagoan approach to competition law85
is relying upon rational decisions that don’t materialise to remedy anticompet-
itive harms.
As a critique of contemporary antitrust doctrines, there is little of surprise
here. But what is puzzling is how Wardhaugh includes it within a work pro-
moting the formal rule of law, which allows ‘rational agents to plan and order
their lives’ (116).
His explanation is that the rule of law ‘requires consistency between what
the law says it does and what it in fact does’ (116).Rooted in Fuller’s discussion
81 C. Jolls, C. Sunstein, and R. Thaler, ‘A Behavioral Approach to Law and Economics’ (1998) 50
Stan LRev 1471.
82 For example A. Reeves and M. Stucke, ‘Behavioral Antitrust’ (2011) 86 Indiana LJ 1527; M.
Stucke, ‘Behavioral Antitrust and Monopolization’ (2012) 8 JCLE 545.
83 cf P. Corr and A. Plagnol, Behavioral Economics: The Basics (Oxford: Routledge, 2019) 135-137
(on social norms);C.May, ‘Market Exchange and the Rule of Law:Confidence in Predictability’
(2018) 10 HJRL 365 (taking behavioural insights to reach conclusions on the rule of law closer
to institutional economics).
84 See Corr and Plagnol, ibid,89-118; Jolls,Sunstein,and Thaler,n 81 above,1476-1487;Reeves and
Stucke,n 82 above,1532-1545;M.Walker, ‘Behavioural Economics:The Lessons for Regulators’
(2017) 13 ECJ 1, 4-11.
85 See R.Stones, ‘The Chicago School and the Formal Rule of Law’ (2018) 14 JCLE 527,533-542.
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of congruence between ‘official activity and rule’ (116),86 Chapter 4 finds a
‘divergence from the stated goal’ (117) of welfare maximisation owing to an
overreliance on rationality, allowing harmful practices to continue.
Be that as it may, the analytical lens adopted by Wardhaugh to query the
link between the goal/s of competition law and its outcomes raises a signif-
icant question: is behavioural economics a friend or a foe to the formal rule
of law ideal? Wardhaugh is not alone in assuming harmony.87 But this part has
argued that the political and economic virtues of comprehensible laws lie in
their connection to individual rationality. New Institutional Economics, above,
accepts that rationality is bounded.Market actors cannot know everything and
commonly rely on institutions (for example prices, laws) to inform and stabilise
their course of action. But while New Institutional Economics focuses upon
external obstacles to rational decision-making – unknowable information, the
uncertain conduct of others – behavioural economics looks at the internal cog-
nitive biases and use of imperfect heuristics which ‘induce systematic error into
the reasoning process’ (130). How are we to reconcile the alleged downfall of
rational homo economicus at the hands of behavioural insights with promotion of
the rational legal agent envisaged by the formal rule of law?
This question might be thought redundant. Thaler and Sunstein’s influential
repackaging of behavioural economics as ‘nudge’ theory88 has caused alter-
ations to laws, policies, and guidance to steer citizens towards selecting ‘better’
outcomes. Legally, this has often taken the form of altering default positions
(for example utilising inertia to increase organ donation or pension payments
by making schemes opt-out).89 In the field of competition policy, it could be
suggested that coherence between behavioural insights and predictable legal
tests can be achieved by incorporating the empirical findings of the former
into the design of the latter, as is Wardhaugh’s overall recommendation (11-12,
211–212, 222).Alternatively, providing soft law guidance on the scope of com-
petition norms could counterbalance the biases of bounded rationality, allowing
subjects to more effectively choose the path of legality.90
However, it is unclear whether these possible reconciliations solve the eco-
nomic irrationality / legal rationality conundrum. First, incorporating be-
havioural economics into the design of comprehensible laws would require
its empirical findings to be generalisable and predictable deviations from ratio-
nality; not ‘random’ or ‘impossible’ to foresee but something that can be ‘mod-
elled’.91 For instance, that consumers generally don’t price the costs of secondary
markets into purchasing the primary product, or that firms often do engage in
irrational predation, with potential competitors likely to not counterbalance
86 Fuller, n 14 above, 81-91, also discussed below.
87 Reeves and Stucke, n 82 above, 1543;M. Stucke, ‘Does the Rule of Reason Violate the Rule of
Law?’ (2009) 42 UC Davis LRev 1375, 1480.
88 R. Thaler and C. Sunstein,Nudge: Improving Decisions about Health, Wealth and Happiness (New
Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2008).
89 R. Lepenies and M.Malecka, ‘The Institutional Consequences of Nudging – Nudges, Politics,
and the Law’ (2015) 6 Rev Philosophy and Psychology 427, 430.
90 G. de Moncuit, ‘Relevance and Shortcomings of Behavioural Economics in Antitrust Deter-
rence’ (2020) 11 JECL & Pract 228, 233-234
91 Jolls, Sunstein, and Thaler, n 81 above, 1471, 1475, 1477-1478.
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post-predation recoupment through entry.While some argue that this is possi-
ble,92 one proponent of behavioural law and economics labels this a ‘fundamen-
tal methodological error’.93 Tor suggests that behavioural findings cannot be
generalised from their specific context without losing the considerable hetero-
geneity of behaviour,whether between firms and consumers on the same mar-
ket or even the same decision-maker in differing contexts.94 The mixed lessons
of behavioural economics for designing predictable laws also relates to the clash
between conflicting biases: how do we know whether businesses will succumb
to inertia and overestimate negative outcomes, warning against market entry,
or the bias of overconfidence, incentivising even unwise entry?95 Such over-
all ambiguity often leads advocates of incorporating behavioural insights into
antitrust to champion the factual sensitivity of effects-based standards, thereby
accounting for the biases and heuristics of the specific actors on the market in
question.96 But as Wardhaugh argues throughout Competition, Effects and Pre-
dictability, this method for determining illegality is the antithesis of achieving
the certainty of the formal rule of law. Is Chapter 4 supporting an approach to
antitrust that actually reduces predictability?
The second issue is whether nudge theory as implemented really realises both
the rule of law and the lessons of behavioural economics. On the first goal, its
most prevalent policy consequence of altering default scenarios is, despite being
clear, unlike the ideal envisaged of the rational actor under the formal rule of
law. Rather than internalising the law, understanding rights and obligations to
plan action, a different default is imposed to deliberately exploit inertia, hoping
that subjects won’t actively engage and opt-out.The legal form of nudge theory
has been stylised ‘law-as-instrumental’ as it is not dependent upon individuals
understanding and reacting to its requirements.97 If anything, quite the oppo-
site. In contrast to the formal rule of law ideal that Wardhaugh champions, the
law used to nudge citizens therefore doesn’t need to be comprehensible to sub-
jects.98 On whether nudge theory is true to behavioural economics, consider
the alternative policy of providing more information to thwart cognitive biases.
Does this cohere with the foundational tenet that bounded rationality prevents
the processing of significant amounts of data in deciding what to do, causing
reliance upon imperfect heuristics? It is for this reason that Thaler and Sun-
stein’s nudge theory has been criticised as actually rehabilitating the rationally
unbounded homo economicus through providing solutions to overcome cogni-
tive limitations.99 Analogies could be drawn with incorporating behavioural
92 Jolls, Sunstein, and Thaler, ibid;Walker, n 84 above, 3, 26.
93 A. Tor, ‘Understanding Behavioral Antitrust’ (2014) 92 Texas LRev 573, 579.
94 ibid. Similarly:R.Van den Bergh, ‘Behavioral Economics:Not Ready for the Main Stage’ (2013)
9 JCLE 203, 214; de Moncuit, n 90 above.
95 Van den Bergh, ibid, 214-216; de Moncuit, ibid, 236.
96 For example G. Niels, R. Van Dyck, and L. Fields, ‘Behavioral Economics and its Impact on
Competition Policy: A Practical Assessment’ (2013) 12 Comp Law 374, 379; Tor, n 93 above,
651 (albeit recognising the ‘significant challenges’ for predictability).
97 Lepenies and Malecka, n 89 above, 431.
98 ibid, 432.
99 Corr and Plagnol, n 83 above, 166-169, summarising G. Infante, G. Lecouteux, and R. Sugden,
‘Preference Purification and the Inner Rational Agent:A Critique of the Conventional Wisdom
of Behavioural Welfare Economics’ (2016) 23 Journal of Economic Methodology 1.
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economics into the design of clear and predictable legal tests for antitrust.There
is something jarring in addressing bounded rationality by altering the law, a
collection of norms that individuals are expected to internalise and act upon.
Wardhaugh’s claim at the end of Chapter 4 that law ‘must be capable of be-
ing addressed by (boundedly rational) human beings’ by absorbing behavioural
findings may be expecting allegedly irrational economic actors to rationally
engage with the law.
It is not possible here to do justice to the gargantuan question of whether
behavioural economics is friend or foe to advocates of the formal rule of law.
This friction is acute in Chapter 4 of Competition,Effects and Predictability,where
Wardhaugh adopts the findings of a field premised on the irrationality of in-
dividuals in a book advocating the rationality-respecting formal rule of law.
Absent a justification for assuming coherence between the two, Wardhaugh’s
account may itself be accused of incongruence between its goals and outcomes.
In contrast, there is another dimension to the formal rule of law that doesn’t
rely on rationality to the same extent. Given Wardhaugh’s ambiguous message
in Chapter 4, it is unfortunate that it is barely mentioned.
GENERALISED LAWS OF EQUAL APPLICATION
Principle 2 – Generalised laws of equal application: two mutually reinforcing ide-
als.100 First, generalisation relates to normative scope: laws are abstracted away from
particular individuals and situations that can be brought within their ambit. Second,
equal application concerns enforcement: law is applied equally to all instances falling
within its scope, consistent with past and future enforcement. The antithesis of this
is subject-specific legal determination based upon individual circumstances, usually
achieved through discretion or ex post consequentialist analysis.
The aspiration towards generalised norms of equal application is a perennial
element of the formal rule of law, included by Fuller and Raz who Wardhaugh
bases his conceptualisation upon (19). Yet a discussion of generality is absent
from Chapter 1. It isn’t until page 210 that Wardhaugh notes ‘[g]ood rules,
from an administrative perspective, have an element of generality to them’. But
even then, this is justified by decisional cost-savings – of being content with
correct application to most, not all instances – rather than any compelling po-
litical or economic virtue. This accords with Frank Easterbrook’s work and the
‘Neo’-Chicagoan emphasis upon error and enforcement costs, which ought to
be considered when deciding whether to determine legality through imper-
fect generalisations or (notionally) perfect case-specific analysis.101 But is that
it? If decision-makers never made errors and minimised administrative costs,
should competition lawyers stop caring about generality? This section will rem-
edy the gap in Competition, Effects and Predictability by demonstrating the polit-
ical and economic significance of aspirations towards generalised laws of equal
application.
100 M.Radin, ‘Reconsidering the Rule of Law’ (1989) 69 Boston ULRev 781, 785.
101 Stones, n 85 above, 549-553, and the works cited in n 11 above.
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Political significance
Returning to the tense relationship between freedom and coercion at the heart
of liberalism,while the first principle of the formal rule of law was directed to-
wards facilitating rational decision-making,generalised laws of equal application
restrain centralised power by formally preventing subject-specific legal deter-
minations. In committing to laws abstracted from particulars and unwavering
in their application, the benefits of imperfect rigidity are argued to outweigh
the detriments of inflexibility to circumstances.102
For many liberal theorists, limiting coercion to generalised laws of equal appli-
cation constitutes a politically valuable bulwark beyond more frequently lauded
constitutional mechanisms (for example limited competence conferral, rights).
The preference for this legal form over subject-specific determinations of le-
gality is recurrent throughout liberal writing: Locke’s advocacy of ‘a standing
Rule to live by, common to every one’ as opposed to the ‘inconstant, uncer-
tain, unknown, arbitrary Will of another Man’;103 Dicey’s championing of laws
applying to all, not ‘of arbitrary power’, prerogative, or broad administrative dis-
cretion;104 Hayek’s distinctions between the ‘Rule of Law’and ‘ad hoc action’,105
‘abstract rules’ and ‘particular commands’,106 or, in his later work, ‘nomos’ and
‘thesis’;107 Raz contrasting the restraint of the formal rule of law with the ‘ar-
bitrary power’ to issue ‘particular legal orders’;108 or Rawls on the justice of
‘regularity’ in one’s dealings through the restrained enforcement of impartial
laws.109
The common justification for preferring the application of generalised laws
over more discriminating determinations of legality concerns liberty: formally
preventing ad hoc, subject-specific evaluations of permitted and prohibited leaves
subjects freer to pursue their ends within the known limits of the law.110 The
value of abstraction was at the core of Kant’s Doctrine of Right: state coercion
is rightful when enforcing universal laws guaranteeing the mutual freedom of
all.111 The result is ‘a constitution in which law itself rules and depends on
no particular person’,112 cautioning against the conferral of open-ended pow-
ers to determine rights and obligations in an individualised manner.113 Such
102 Hayek,LLL n 17 above, 194; F. Schauer,Playing by the Rules: A Philosophical Examination of Rule-
Based Decision-Making in Law and in Life (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1991) 31-33; R. Epstein,
Simple Rules for a Complex World (Cambridge,MA:Harvard University Press, 1995) 38-39, 53; F.
Schauer and R. Zeckhauser, ‘Regulation by Generalization’ (2007) 1 Regulation and Governance
68.
103 Locke, n 26 above, [S22].
104 A. Dicey, Introduction to the Study of the Law of the Constitution (1915, Indianapolis, IN: Liberty
Fund, 8th ed, 1982) 120-121.
105 Hayek, Serfdom n 17 above, 75-76.
106 Hayek,Constitution n 26 above, 131.
107 Hayek, LLL n 17 above, chs 5 and 6.
108 Raz, n 15 above, 219.
109 Rawls, n 42 above, 206-209.
110 Locke, n 26 above, [S22], [S57], [S137]; Dicey, n 104 above, 110; Unger, n 16 above, 69-70.
111 Kant, n 25 above, 397, 388-389.
112 ibid, 480-481.
113 A. Ripstein, Force and Freedom: Kant’s Legal and Political Philosophy (Cambridge, MA: Harvard
University Press, 2009) 211-212.
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abstraction generates end-independent obligations that otherwise afford the
freedom to do as one wishes.114 For Habermas, the Kantian notion of gener-
alised norms guaranteeing equal spheres of autonomy goes to the very concept
of law.115 Kant’s advocacy of formal legal equality was central to later theo-
rising on the Rechtsstaat through the nineteenth century,116 to which Hayek‘s
conceptualisation of law as nomos, ‘purpose-independent rules’,117 is arguably
indebted. Through the process of abstraction beyond specifics,118 laws become
reliable ‘data’ upon which individuals can plan.119 Autonomy shifts from the
decision-maker to the subject as generalised laws rigidify determinations of le-
gality, removing the discretion to prohibit and permit conduct reactively.120 For
Locke, this restricted the ‘Tyranny’ of ‘arbitrary and irregular commands’ that
may ‘impoverish, harass, or subdue’ individuals.121 It is a formal bulwark against
a discriminatory ‘reign of status’,122 the ‘ad hoc application of state power against
individuals or groups singled out for special treatment’.123 Without particular-
istic legal decision-making, the ‘cost of oppression’124 increases as generalised
reductions of liberty hold friends ‘hostage’ with enemies.125 It also prevents
beneficial economic privileges as a result of lobbying, discussed below.
There are undoubtedly limits to the realisation of this desideratum.The gen-
eral scope of laws often falls short of universality, resulting in different categories
of legal subject (landlord, employer, dominant undertaking).126 Still, so long as
the categories are not sham placeholders for individuals or small groups, and
norms are applied equally to all in the category,the worst excesses of discrimina-
tory, individualised determinations are avoided, and this lauded political benefit
of the formal rule of law may be approximated.
Economic significance
According to New Institutional Economics (NIE), the framework of laws sur-
rounding market behaviour has an impact upon spontaneous economic or-
dering. But in recognising their formative role in the economy, this makes
114 I.Kant, ‘On the Common Saying:That May be Correct in Theory, but is of No Use in Practice’
in Gregor,n 25 above,291;M.Gregor,Laws of Freedom (Oxford:Basil Blackwell,1963) 28,37-38,
46.
115 Habermas, n 20 above, 82-83.
116 W.Von Humboldt,The Sphere and Duties of Government (London: John Chapman, 1854) 117; E.
Böckenförde, ‘The Origin and Development of the Concept of the Rechtsstaat’ in State, Society
and Liberty: Studies in Political Theory and Constitutional Law (New York, NY: Berg, 1991) 50.
117 Hayek, LLL n 17 above, 82.
118 ibid, 205.
119 Hayek,Constitution n 26 above, 20. Similarly, ibid, 53, 132, 270;Hayek,Serfdom n 17 above, 61-62,
76.
120 ibid, 131-132, 134-135.
121 Locke,n 26 above, [S199]-[S201].Similarly,Dicey,n 104 above,111;Raz,n 15 above,219;Unger,
n 16 above, 70, 177; Rawls, n 42 above, 209.
122 Hayek,Constitution n 26 above, 135.
123 Epstein, n 28 above, 20.
124 R. Posner,Economic Analysis of Law (Austin, TX: Aspen Publishers, 7th ed, 2007) 266.
125 Epstein, n 28 above, 67. Similarly: Hayek,Constitution n 26 above, 135-136, 184; Summers, n 19
above, 139; Tamanaha, n 13 above, 71.
126 Leoni, n 26 above, 68-69;Waldron, n 41 above, 81-82; Tamanaha, n 13 above, 94.
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institutions particularly valuable assets for private actors who may wish to influ-
ence market outcomes.Once again,NIE reaches comparable conclusions to lib-
eral political theory on the desirability of the formal rule of law.As Wardhaugh
briefly implies (207), generalised and equally applicable laws limit private ma-
nipulation of economic outcomes more decisively than when subject-specific
determinations of legality are permissible.
Hayek’s final volume of Law,Legislation and Liberty is an extended assault upon
‘para-government’, the assemblage of interests that circle centralised decision-
making and intend to divert ‘the stream of governmental favour to their mem-
bers.’127 The endeavours of these groups are manifold: limiting entry to certain
trades to restrict output;128 fixing prices for specific industries;129 raising im-
port tariffs to shield domestic firms;130 designating cartels or monopolies for
legal protection;131 disadvantaging successful businesses to shield less efficient
rivals.132 These subject-specific interventions intend to ‘bring about a partic-
ular result which is different from that which would have been produced if
the mechanism had been allowed unaided to follow its inherent principles.’133
Hayek’s caution was not novel. Adam Smith warned against private efforts to
secure governmental privileges that artificially distort market forces.134
Hayek’s criticisms are closely related to public choice theory. Its concern is
the principal-agent problem between citizens and state actors: that those en-
trusted with centralised decision-making powers may act opportunistically or
against the common good owing to the costliness of monitoring.135 As a result,
organised private interests may come to direct state powers to their own ends.
Profitable privileges can be accrued by successfully negotiating market inter-
ventions that lessen competitive forces (closing entry, restricting imports, pro-
tective regulations).136 This risk is heightened with a small focused collection of
market actors as the spoils are shared between fewer beneficiaries.137 But main-
taining the competitiveness of the free-market economy is not simply about
preventing privately-desired regulation. As the Ordoliberals forewarned,138
competition policy may be a prominent target of lobbying for and against in-
terventions.139 Therefore to guarantee the optimal operation of the free market,
127 Hayek, LLL n 17 above, 356.
128 Hayek,Constitution n 26 above, 199; Hayek, LLL ibid, 175, 426.
129 Hayek, LLL ibid, 300.
130 ibid, 353.
131 Hayek, Serfdom n 17 above, 48; Hayek, LLL ibid, 413, 423.
132 Hayek, LLL ibid, 417.
133 ibid, 287.
134 Smith, n 48 above, 228, 231-232, 358-359.
135 Kasper and Streit, n 63 above, 65. See also: M. Olson, The Rise and Decline of Nations: Economic
Growth, Stagflation, and Social Rigidities (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1982) 17-19.
136 M. Green and R. Nader, ‘Economic Regulation vs Competition: Uncle Sam the Monopoly
Man’ (1973) 82 YLJ 871, 879; Olson ibid, 43-47, 59-60, 62-65; Kasper and Streit, ibid, 247-248,
285,324-326;V.Vanberg, ‘Ordnungspolitik,The Freiburg School and the Reason of Rules’ (2014)
21 i-lex 205, 217.
137 Olson, ibid, 29-31.
138 For example W.Eucken, ‘The Competitive Order and its Implementation’ (2006) 2 Competition
Policy International 219, 241.
139 See F. McChesney and W. Shughart (eds) The Causes and Consequences of Antitrust: The Public-
Choice Perspective (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1995).
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preventing anticompetitive regulations and defending a robust competition pol-
icy, it is necessary to erect ‘institutional constraints on competition for political
favours’.140
While public choice theory warns against private steering of centralised
power in the economy, constitutional economics aims to provide a solution
by interpreting binding norms (discrete competences, fundamental rights) as
pre-commitment mechanisms.141 For example, although content with how a
benevolent dictator currently exercises their omnipotence, we may fear that
their unknown successor could use unbounded power for oppression. Simi-
larly, a decision-maker may now believe that long-term policy success is based
upon doing X (eg prohibiting cartels), but later emergencies could lead them
to abandon X and do Y (accepting crisis cartels to manage job losses). In both
instances, constraints are formulated today to prevent undesirable outcomes in
the unpredictable future.
Taken together, public choice theory and constitutional economics advo-
cate tying the hands of public actors for when ‘they are tempted to abandon
principles’ on an as-needed basis.142 Although various substantive requirements
could be contemplated to limit market-distorting regulation and impression-
able competition enforcement, the simplest preventative measure is to formally
restrain the state from discriminatory actions in the market by determining
legality through applying generalised norms.143 This prevents the granting of
individualised legal privileges to private interests, thus shielding the continuing
operation of the free market order.144 Hayek applied this logic to cartel law,
cautioning against ‘discretionary surveillance to prevent abuse’ and favouring a
general prohibition without exception.145
Formally restricting centralised interventions in the economy is contro-
versial. As argued below, this cautious logic coheres with the liberal eco-
nomic convictions underpinning competition enforcement. Still, it should be
noted that similar worries have occupied consumer rights advocates146 and less
politically-charged economists than those above.147 Decision-makers abandon-
ing the common good by reflecting exogenous influence is a perennial worry
across the political spectrum. But particularly for those extolling the virtues of
free markets, the rule of law ideal is of considerable economic benefit:mandat-
ing market interventions (regulation, competition enforcement) through the
equal application of generalised laws formally prevents ad hoc determinations of
legality artificially favouring some market actors over others.
140 Kasper and Streit, n 63 above, 249.
141 See:G.Brennan and J.Buchanan,The Reason of Rules:Constitutional Political Economy (Cambridge:
CUP, 1985) 74-79; Vanberg, n 47 above;Mantzavinos, n 63 above, 243-244.
142 Kasper and Streit, n 63 above, 335.
143 Hayek, LLL n 17 above, 359, 439, 463. Similarly Brennan and Buchanan, n 141 above, 29.
144 Kasper and Streit, n 63 above, 316; Mantzavinos, n 63 above, 244-245; Vanberg, n 136 above,
211, 218.
145 Hayek, LLL n 17 above, 423-424.
146 For example Green and Nader, n 136 above, 876.
147 For example Olson, n 135 above.
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The generalisation trade-off and competition law
Perhaps one of the reasons Wardhaugh avoids discussing generalised laws, a mo-
tif of the formal rule of law, is its controversy in contrast to legal certainty.There
is a difficult trade-off between the positives of both generalised norms, blind to
individual circumstances, and subject-specific determinations that can reflect
contextual factors. Conflicting evaluations are unavoidable. It is not inherently
more ‘just’ to treat all instances the same, rather than recognising particularities
of circumstance.148
The above articulation of the political significance of generalised and equally-
applied laws comes from the liberal tradition. When faced with centralised
power to take individualised decisions, the reaction is understandably cautious,
fearing the worst and preferring a more restrained form. The same is true for
its economic value: limiting ad hoc interventions seems wise to those favour-
ing decentralised, market-based ordering over greater state interference in the
economy. But not everyone will reach the same conclusion.
Disapproval of aspiring towards generalised laws is common in Marxist and
critical legal scholarship.Marx’s early writings analysed the separation between
the abstracted political sphere, where individuals enjoy formal legal equality
under generalised laws, and the reality of civil society, where everyday life is
marked by inequalities.149 The liberal interpretation of the formal rule of law
thus masked and legitimated injustice,150 an approach subsequently refined by
Bolshevik jurist Evgeny Pashukanis to a pre-condition for capitalism151 and
a means of class subjugation.152 These themes – the false equality of abstract
laws, the legitimating relationship between liberal legalism and capitalist power
dynamics – recurred throughout the 1970s and the 1980s, not just in Marxist
writing on the formal rule of law,153 but also within the Critical Legal Studies
movement.154 Nonet, Selznick, and Unger all detailed how aspirations toward
legal equality, ignoring material circumstance,clashed with post-war endeavours
towards substantive justice through bureaucratic decision-making by the welfare
state.155
These criticisms of generalisation are serious but not fatal. Since the 1970s,
some have softened their assault, adopting a more nuanced middle-ground
which recognises the important struggles for basic legal equality by women
148 Schauer, n 102 above, 136-137.
149 K.Marx,Critique of Hegel’s Philosophy of Right, J. O’Malley (ed), A. Jolin and J. O’Malley (trans)
(1843, Cambridge: CUP, 1970) 72-73, 77-78, 116; K. Marx, ‘“On the Jewish Question”’ in J.
O’Malley (ed) Marx: Early Political Writings (Cambridge: CUP, 1994) 36, 48.
150 Marx,Hegel ibid, 80-81, 137;Marx, ‘Jewish Question’ ibid 34-38, 43-48.
151 E. Pashukanis,The General Theory of Law & Marxism,C. Arthuer (ed), B. Einhorn (trans) (1924,
New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers, 2002) 68, 82-88, 93, 115, 120-121.
152 ibid, ch 5.
153 For example I. Balbus, ‘Commodity Form and Legal Form: An Essay on the “Relative Au-
tonomy” of the Law’ (1979) 11 Law & Society Review 571; M. Horwitz, The Rule of Law: An
Unqualified Human Good?’ (1979) 86 YLJ 561; H. Collins,Marxism and Law (Oxford: OUP,
1982) 136-140.
154 R.Unger, ‘The Critical Legal Studies Movement’ (1983) 96 HLR 561.
155 Unger, n 16 above, 179, 192-199, 204-205; Nonet and Selznick, n 16 above, 54, 57, 60-64.
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and minority groups.156 Nonet, Selznick, and (early) Unger themselves exhib-
ited reservations about abandoning the formal rule of law in pursuit of subject-
specific discretionary determinations of what would be the ‘just’ outcome in
the instant case.157
But particularly when focusing upon the field in hand, solving the gener-
alisation trade-off differently becomes more persuasive. Competition lawyers
should take seriously the liberal political and economic significance of aspiring
to generalised,equally-applicable laws because competition enforcement is a liberal en-
deavour. It is founded upon the benefits of a decentralised, free market economy
over centralised direction of economic forces,while accepting that interventions
are necessary to remedy distortions by market actors. This goes directly to why
the economic significance of generalised norms (reducing state-based interfer-
ence, preventing privileges and discriminatory enforcement) should be given
credence by competition lawyers. But it also relates to its political significance
and ideological consistency: how can one fear discriminatory decision-making,
manipulation by private interests, and the impact upon individual autonomy
in the economic realm but reach contrary conclusions on the significance of
generalised laws in the political realm?
The principle of the formal rule of law that laws be generalised and equally
applied comes at a cost.This part has articulated how the trade-off has generally
been resolved by political liberals and free marketeers.While those of differing
dispositions may disagree, aspiring towards generalised laws of equal applica-
tion is significant when one starts from the political and economic liberalism
underpinning competition policy.
JUDICIAL REVIEW AND ADJUDICATION
Principle 3 – Judicial review and adjudication: an independent mechanism for re-
viewing legal determinations, including the source of decision-making power and
the legal meaning of conditions conferring power (for example prohibiting ‘an-
ticompetitive’ conduct). This mechanism also adjudicates legal disputes between
ordinary subjects, enforcing rights and obligations. The antithesis of this is either
the lack of review and adjudication,or, if review exists,where a decision-maker en-
joys deference: the absence of scrutiny of its determinations of legality, particularly
with regards to the law and legal characterisation of facts.
The formal principles of the rule of law advanced hitherto are aspirational ide-
als. This they would probably remain without judicial review and adjudication.
It will be argued that this third institutional aspiration is of key instrumental
value to the realisation of the two formal principles. First, it ensures congru-
ence between law and life. The formal rule of law is meaningless if reality
cannot be made to match the law. Second, adjudication and review present
156 For example B. Fine,Democracy and the Rule of Law: Liberal Ideals and Marxist Critiques (London:
Pluto Press, 1984) 1-2.
157 Unger, n 16 above, 238-249; Nonet and Selznick, n 16 above, 82-83, 117.
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opportunities for reactive refinement towards generalised and comprehensible
norms, rendering the formal rule of law a more achievable ideal.
Unlike generalised laws, courts do play a significant role in Competition, Ef-
fects and Predictability.The issue is Wardhaugh’s analysis ranges from ambivalence
on their importance for the formal rule of law (20, 23–24) to hostility: courts
are the villain of Chapter 2 for expanding rule of reason analysis in US an-
titrust, and half of Chapter 5 suggests that jurisprudential shifts on the basis of
evolving economic thinking are undemocratic (152-172). This is a misstep if
Wardhaugh’s intention is to persuade critics that the formal rule of law is im-
portant for competition enforcement. Without courts, the rule of law appears
unrealistic and static in a field that is necessarily dynamic.
Congruence between law and reality
It would be naïve to exclude from even the thinnest conceptualisation of the
rule of law any mechanism for independently checking that determinations of
legality actually are legal and that there continues to be ‘congruence between
official action and declared rule’.158 Wardhaugh recognises this (116). Law can-
not inform individual planning or market choices if rights and obligations are
unenforceable and transgressions by decision-makers or third parties are un-
challengeable.
The independence of the judiciary was part of Montesquieu’s account of
the separation of powers.159 Locke also stressed how property was insecure
in despotic societies lacking enforcement and adjudication by independent
courts.160 But Montesquieu also emphasised the principle of nulla poena sine lege:
no punishment without law.161 Dicey interpreted this notion as a fundamental
requirement of the rule of law, standing for the proposition that no one ‘can be
made to suffer punishment or to pay damages for any conduct not definitely
forbidden by law.’162 This is an admittedly austere requirement of rule by law.
Positivistic nineteenth-century articulations of the Rechtsstaat have particularly
been critiqued for simply legitimating authoritarianism.163 But rule by law is a
necessary precondition for the additional formal desiderata of the rule of law.164
Hayek therefore claimed that judicial review of the legality of administrative
decision-making was actually a significant legacy of positivist thinking on the
Rechtsstaat.165 Several theorists thus include judicial oversight among the ‘ba-
sic institutional conditions that bolster the formal qualities of rule-based order,
158 Fuller, n 14 above, 81.
159 Montesquieu, n 29 above, 198-199.
160 Locke, n 26 above, [S91], [S124]-[S126].
161 Montesquieu, n 29 above, 197.
162 Dicey, n 104 above, lv. See also 110-111.
163 For example L. Krieger, The German Idea of Freedom: History of a Political Tradition (Chicago, IL:
University of Chicago Press, 1957) 254-255; M. Loughlin, Foundations of Public Law (Oxford:
OUP, 2010) 318.
164 Hayek,Constitution n 26 above, 173-174, 181.
165 ibid, 185. See also: Böckenförde, n 116 above, 54-55.
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converting it into an operative regime’.166 Indeed, some go so far as to claim it
is a necessary element of the concept of law itself.167
Reactive refinement towards the formal rule of law
Beyond ensuring congruence between law and reality, adjudication and judicial
review provide key opportunities for the legal order to be dynamically refor-
mulated towards the formal ideals of generality and comprehensibility.
Achieving legal certainty is an on-going process that is never complete.Nor-
mative ambiguity is unavoidable. There will always be questions regarding the
application of laws at the periphery owing to factual novelty, technological de-
velopment,and the open-textured vagueness of language.168 In competition law,
changes in our economic understanding of the consequences of business be-
haviour are an additional catalyst, prompting reappraisal of pre-existing norms.
A static, unchanging collection of obligations unambiguously delineating legal-
ity is a fantasy.Rather than a binary quality, realising the formal rule of law is to
approximate, but never reach, a politically and economically significant ideal.
But who is driving this dynamic revaluation, responding to factual, tech-
nological, linguistic, and economic uncertainty with clearer laws? The actor
is conceptually irrelevant: it could be the legislature passing new statutes, the
courts resolving disputes, or, where relevant, an administrative decision-maker
enforcing obligations (for example prohibiting restrictions of competition or
abuses of market dominance).169 In reality, this is a collaborative endeavour, al-
beit uneven.As the infrequent substantive pronouncements of EU legislators on
antitrust demonstrate,170 day-to-day refinement of legal obligations primarily
occurs elsewhere.
Adjudication of disputes by courts is key to the dynamic evolution of
a legal order and ultimately, its gradual approximation of the formal rule
of law. As Hayek suggested, courts curate the substance and form of law.171
Wherever ambiguity arises, adjudication offers the route to ‘gradual
perfection’.172 Cases are Janus-faced: while parties often litigate reactively to
resolve specific disputes, they are simultaneously opportunities for prospective
166 Loughlin, n 163 above, 335. For example Hayek, Constitution n 26 above, 174, 185; Raz, n 15
above, 216-218; Unger, n 16 above, 177; Nonet and Selznick, n 16 above, 54; Habermas, n 20
above, 173; Rawls, n 42 above, 209-210.
167 J. Waldron, ‘The Concept and the Rule of Law’ (2008) 43 GaLRev 1, 20, 55-57. Similarly:
Habermas, n 20 above, 134.
168 Radin, n 100 above; Schauer, n 102 above, 35-36; C. Sunstein, ‘Problems with Rules’ (1995) 83
CalLRev 953, 984-985; T. Endicott, ‘The Impossibility of the Rule of Law’ (1999) 19 OJLS 1,
6-7.
169 cf M. Shapiro, The Supreme Court and Administrative Agencies (New York, NY: Free Press, 1968)
44-45, 91-93.
170 Aside from occasional block exemption and sectoral regulations, Article 101 and 102 TFEU
inherited from the Treaty of Rome 1957 continue to be the main provisions.
171 Hayek, LLL n 17 above, 113.
172 ibid, 96. Similarly: 191; Habermas, n 20 above, 144.
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norm creation, reformulation, and elaboration.173 Courts can clarify rights and
obligations to reduce uncertainty and generalise their findings beyond the in-
stant dispute to all, permitting wider cognisance of the boundary between le-
gality and illegality. Precedents can collectively crystallise into a body of general
and comprehensible norms, a gloss upon bare statute, thereby more closely ap-
proximating the rule of law ideal. Justice Scalia claimed that US antitrust law
developed in this incremental manner from ambiguously worded origins in the
Sherman Act to a more ‘precise, principled content’ for legal subjects as a result
of the ‘judicial craft’.174
But reactive refinement by courts towards the rule of law is just as
important – if not even more so – in the presence of an administrative decision-
maker tasked with enforcing legal obligations (for example the European Com-
mission). There is nothing conceptually preventing this institution from con-
tributing to the gradual realisation of the formal rule of law. Its pattern of indi-
vidual decisions could establish comprehensible norms of legality and illegality
of general application to all, consistency enforced in past and future instances.
Considering economic developments, technological change and business un-
certainty, and mindful of avoiding retrospective illegality, it might also circulate
informative guidelines on enforcement.
While possible, it is doubtful that administrative enforcement alone would
deliver a legal order approximating the formal rule of law.Such decision-makers
tend not to have exclusive jurisdiction to interpret legal obligations,175 leaving
their findings or guidance of uncertain precedential status. This instability is
exacerbated by informal enforcement mechanisms.176 But rather than compre-
hensibility, it is the equal application of generalised norms that is less likely to
materialise from administrative enforcement alone. Inequality in the applica-
tion of law, or enforcement discretion, is a corollary of limited time and fi-
nite budgets,making selective prosecution of notorious targets more appealing.
Decision-makers cannot be expected to always think like administrative Im-
manuel Kants, transforming particulars into norms of universal application; it is
legally sufficient for the specific factual instance investigated to meet the (usu-
ally broad) standard for valid enforcement (‘restricting competition’, ‘abuse’ of
‘dominance’) rather than to extrapolate more widely.
These risks demonstrate that judicial review is a valuable failsafe for gradu-
ally realising the formal rule of law. As with adjudication of disputes, review of
administrative decisions offers courts the opportunity to translate particularised
findings into generalised norms applicable to all,while also restricting and rigid-
ifying future enforcement. It might not be necessary for judicial review to fulfil
this function; enforcement decisions may create a legal order of generalised and
comprehensible norms. But if administrative decisions do not cultivate this, the
173 S. Shavell, ‘The Appeals Process as a Means of Error Correction’ (1995) 24 JLS 379; D. Geradin
and N.Petit, ‘Judicial Review in European Union Competition Law:A Quantitative and Qual-
itative Assessment’ (2011) Tilburg Law School Legal Studies Research Paper 01/2011, 5-6.
174 A. Scalia, ‘The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules’ (1989) 56 UChiLRev 1175, 1183.
175 For example Article 19(1) TEU.
176 R. Stones, ‘Commitment Decisions in EU Competition Enforcement: Policy Effectiveness v.
the Formal Rule of Law’ (2019) 38 YEL 361, 383-384.
© 2021 The Authors.The Modern Law Review published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd on behalf of Modern Law Review Limited.
(2021) 84(3) MLR 608–635 631
Why Should Competition Lawyers Care about the Formal Rule of Law?
courts provide a fallback occasion for nevertheless approximating the formal
rule of law.Without such, its realisation is left to administrative decision-makers
who, as indicated throughout this piece, have incentives to avoid its restraint.
When shifting from theoretical ideal to practical reality, whether the Court
of Justice of the EU (CJEU) lives up to this ideal in competition matters is
debateable.With few Commission decisions pursuant to Articles 101 and 102
TFEU being subsequently overturned, the standard of review exercised by EU
Courts under Article 263 TFEU has been a vexed issue for years.177 But this is
only part of the picture. The Courts could successfully approve every ‘correct’
and quash every ‘wrong’ decision without translating subject-specific, incom-
prehensible Commission findings into clearer legal obligations for all. Further-
more, when analysing whether the CJEU is curating a legal order approximat-
ing the formal rule of law, it is also necessary to consider its articulations of
competition law in response to Article 267 TFEU preliminary reference re-
quests which don’t involve prior Commission decisions. The CJEU’s overall
record is mixed. On the one hand, it has crafted a series of presumptions of
illegality: not just for restrictions ‘by object’ under Article 101 TFEU when
economic learning suggests anticompetitive outcomes are likely,178 but also for
certain practices engaged in by dominant firms under Article 102 TFEU. A
notable instance of the latter,where the CJEU did approximate the formal rule
of law, is AKZO Chemie BV v Commission. The Court rejected the Commis-
sion’s desire for broad discretion to censure ‘unfair’ predation in favour of a
clear presumption that prices below average variable cost are abusive.179 The
Court has also crafted a series of presumptions of legality for types of restrictive
clauses (qualitative criteria for selective distribution180 and common restric-
tions in franchising arrangements)181 and certain agreements (open exclusive
licences182 and territorially exclusive copyright licencing arrangements).183 On
the other hand, the CJEU has posited subject-specific determinations of legal-
ity through effects-based analysis in key cases on exclusivity and single brand-
ing agreements.184 Purely effects-based evaluations of lawfulness require the
Commission to engage in complex factual analysis that takes many economists
with information, resources, and expertise months to conclude; how are busi-
nesses to predict whether their agreements are legal? As is Wardhaugh’s central
177 See for example I. Forrester, ‘A Bush in Need of Pruning: The Luxuriant Growth of Light
Judicial Review’ in C.Elhermann and M.Marquis (eds),European Competition Law Annual 2009:
Evaluation of Evidence and its Judicial Review in Competition Cases (Oxford,Hart:2011);A.Kalintiri,
‘What’s in a Name? The Marginal Standard of Review of “Complex Economic Assessments”
In EU Competition Enforcement’ [2016] 53 CMLRev 1283.
178 On judicial identification of restrictions by object, see C-67/13P Groupement des Cartes Bancaires
ECLI:EU:C:2014:2204. Examples include price-fixing, market-sharing, exchanging sensitive
information, and resale price maintenance.
179 C-62/86 AKZO Chemie BV v Commission ECLI:EU:C:1991:286 at [71], contra ECS/AKZO
[1985] at [74] (Commission wanted to prohibit ‘[a]ny unfair commercial practices … intended
to eliminate, discipline or deter smaller competitors’).
180 C-26/76 Metro-SB-Grossmärkte GmbH v Commission (No 1) ECLI:EU:C:1977:167.
181 C-161/84 Pronuptia de Paris GmbH v Pronuptia de Paris Irmgard Schillgallis ECLI:EU:C:1986:41.
182 C-258/78 Nungesser v Commission ECLI:EU:C:1982:211.
183 C-262/81 Coditel SA and Others v Ciné Vog Films SA and Others (No 2) ECLI:EU:C:1982:334.
184 C-56/65 Société Technique Minière v Maschinenbau Ulm GmbH ECLI:EU:C:1966:38; C-234/89
Delimitis v Henninger Bräu ECLI:EU:C:1991:91.
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argument, an ‘effects-based approach is a threat to the rule of law’ (2). At times
the Courts have also condoned the Commission’s dilution of relatively clear
legal tests by deferring to its legal characterisation of complex facts.185 Finally,
the rise of enforcement through individualised commitment decisions agreed
between the Commission and investigated firms may be limiting the Courts’
ability to shape competition norms towards the ideals of comprehensibility and
generality; a combination of judicial reluctance to incisively scrutinise commit-
ment decisions that do come before them186 and the inability to review the
many commitment decisions that don’t.187 In short, the EU Courts haven’t al-
ways honed the norms of competition law towards the rule of law ideal.
Wardhaugh’s negative appraisal of the judicial record on these issues may
underpin his marginalisation of the courts for achieving legal certainty.But dis-
juncture between theoretical potential and practical reality does not necessarily
mean that the former shouldn’t be an aspiration.Wardhaugh is right to highlight
that US courts have contributed to uncertainty through expanding the effects-
based ‘rule of reason’ standard for determining legality (Chapter 2).As with the
CJEU this is unfortunate, warning that we cannot assume courts will always
grasp opportunities to transform individualised, subject-specific determinations
of legality into clearer, generalised obligations. But this was not inevitable.Nor
is it unsolvable. Seemingly all-encompassing standards can still meet the formal
rule of ideal through precedents that gradually clarify and rigidify the divi-
sion between legal and illegal, whether through introducing presumptions or
multi-stage tests.188 Furthermore,Wardhaugh’s almost absolutist stance on stare
decisis (164-165, 192–203, 213–214) and suggestion that legal change must oc-
cur through democratically-endorsed legislation (152-153, 161–166, 171–172)
are both unhelpful for redeeming the formal rule of law in competition cir-
cles. Insisting upon legal stability and reducing opportunities for reactive evolu-
tion makes the rule of law ideal seem static, dogmatic, and unfeasible in a field
constantly challenged by developments in economics, technology, and business
practices.
In summary, the courts are of instrumental significance for making realisation
of the political and economic virtues of the formal rule of law more achievable.
As caretakers of a dynamic normative order, courts reactively refine legal obli-
gations through adjudicating disputes arising from normative uncertainty and
reviewing administrative decision-making.These are opportunities for courts to
clarify the incomprehensible and generalise from the specific.Whether judges
in competition matters actually fulfil this role is, however, questionable.
185 For example contrast how the legal test from Magill was applied in Microsoft: C-241-
242/91P RTE & ITP v Commission ECLI:EU:C:1995:98; T-201/04 Microsoft v Commission
ECLI:EU:T:2007:289.
186 For example C-441/07P Commission v Alrosa ECLI:EU:C:2010:377;T-76/12 Morningstar Inc v
Commission EU:T:2016:481.
187 Stones, n 176 above, 388-399.
188 P. Schlag, ‘Rules and Standards’ (1985) 33 UCLA Law Review 379, 428-429; L. Kaplow, ‘Rules
versus Standards: An Economic Analysis’ (1992) 42 Duke LJ 557, 611.
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CONCLUSION
Bruce Wardhaugh’s Competition, Effects and Predictability is an important contri-
bution to debates on the appropriate legal form of competition enforcement. It
is the first monograph-length analysis of the formal rule of law in competition
law and is impressive in its breadth.
There are however problems: questioning rationality, key to the significance
of legal certainty; omitting normative generality, a perennial feature of formal
conceptualisations of the ideal; and a dismissive approach to courts, which are
critical for rendering the formal rule of law a dynamic, realistic, and more
achievable aspiration.
But for a supporter of Wardhaugh’s overall argument, the most troubling
aspect of Competition, Effects and Predictability is the absence of a compelling
justification for realising the formal rule of law in this field, capable of ani-
mating the growing movement against ad hoc, subject-specific determinations
of legality. The main purpose of this article has been to fill the justificatory
void by arguing why competition lawyers should care about the formal rule of
law. As summarised in Table 1, centuries of political and economic scholarship
settle upon similar conclusions: comprehensible rights and obligations permit
the meaningful exercise of individual freedom and stabilise markets to facilitate
more efficient reactions to the price mechanism; generalised norms of equal
application rigidify determinations of legality to facilitate freedom,prevent dis-
crimination against individuals, and forestall market-distorting privileges at the
behest of private interests;and the courts provide adjudication,enforcement,and
a fall-back process for gradually approximating these aspirational ideals through
reviewing administrative determinations of legality.
Without a compelling justification, appeals to the formal rule of law can be
brusquely dismissed as legalistic and ethereal, inappropriate in the context of
market interventions pursuing economic goods. But when rejecting the de-
sirability of comprehensible and generalised competition law, which of the
desiderata in Table 1 are critics happiest to marginalise: freedom, responsibil-
ity, effective economic decision-making? Are they content with discrimination
against particular businesses?
As Wardhaugh and the ‘Neo’-Chicagoans argue, economic wisdom can be
incorporated ex ante into the construction of presumptions and multi-stage le-
gal tests, rather than simply settling for the application of ex post, effects-based
standards. Of course, designing legal tests that aspire towards economically ac-
curate outcomes and realisation of the formal rule of law requires solving some
difficult trade-offs. But with an account of its political and economic signifi-
cance, of why competition lawyers should care, the formal rule of law is less
likely to be brushed aside.
634
© 2021 The Authors.The Modern Law Review published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd on behalf of Modern Law Review Limited.








































































































































































































































































































































































































































© 2021 The Authors.The Modern Law Review published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd on behalf of Modern Law Review Limited.
(2021) 84(3) MLR 608–635 635
